The US-Ukraine Security Guarantees: An Explanation

Executive Summary

The August 15th U.S.–Russia summit in Anchorage marked a critical inflection point in the ongoing war in Ukraine. While no final ceasefire was announced, U.S. officials confirmed that President Putin agreed in principle to allow the United States and European allies to extend NATO-style security guarantees to Ukraine—guarantees that fall short of full NATO membership but mirror the mutual defense posture of Article 5.

This development demands serious analysis within the context of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a document I referenced in 2014 when I argued that weak U.S. commitments to Ukraine would invite Russian aggression. My prediction then has been tragically fulfilled. But we now face another historic opportunity—and we must not repeat the same mistake.

The Alaska Accord, if structured correctly, offers a strategic victory for the United States: we can contain Russia, avoid entangling commitments like NATO accession, and gain long-term economic access to Ukraine’s natural wealth. This is a classic rope-a-dope: Russia loses the strategic initiative it sought through invasion, while the U.S. gains ground without putting boots on the battlefield—at least not while Russian military exercises and provocations continue.

1. The Alaska Summit: Strategic Breakthrough or Mirage?

On August 15, 2025, President Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage. In a summit that was both symbol and substance, the two leaders negotiated without formalizing an end to hostilities in Ukraine. However, one breakthrough emerged: Putin reportedly agreed to allow the U.S. and European states to offer Ukraine security guarantees that, while not identical to NATO membership, would trigger serious consequences in the event of renewed Russian aggression.

This proposal sidesteps the contentious issue of NATO enlargement. Ukraine’s NATO accession has been blocked for over a decade, largely due to its contested borders and ongoing conflict. Putin has consistently framed NATO expansion as a red line. Yet this new formulation allows Ukraine to receive meaningful defense guarantees without officially joining NATO.

2. What Do "Security Guarantees" Actually Mean?

These guarantees are best described as Article 5-like protections—commitments from the U.S. and partner nations to respond to future Russian aggression with coordinated military and economic consequences. Such an agreement would be grounded in bilateral or multilateral compacts, not NATO's Washington Treaty.

As reported by U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and confirmed by European officials, these guarantees could include:

• Forward-deployed U.S. and allied defense systems in Western Ukraine

• Expanded intelligence-sharing networks

• Joint military exercises

• Economic integration packages tied to security milestones

These commitments would not constitute a formal treaty, allowing flexibility while conveying seriousness.

3. The Budapest Memorandum: A History of Unkept Promises

To understand what’s at stake, we must revisit the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Under this agreement, Ukraine surrendered the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. These assurances promised that the signatories would “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”

As I wrote in 2014, those assurances were only as good as the will to enforce them. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and its continued aggression since then, proved that mere political assurances—unbacked by enforcement—amount to nothing. The West’s failure to act decisively then invited the aggression we see today.

I argued then that the U.S. should consider deploying ground forces to Ukraine—not to fight a war, but to deter one. We now face a similar decision point. Do we extend credible, enforceable guarantees? Or do we again offer paper promises and hope for the best?

4. Why This Is Not NATO Membership—And Why That’s Good

Some critics argue that offering Ukraine security guarantees without NATO membership is a half-measure. But strategically, it’s a win. NATO membership requires consensus from all members, including those wary of provoking Russia or escalating into a broader war.

Moreover, Ukraine cannot legally join NATO while it has unresolved territorial disputes. By designing an alternative framework of security, we:

• Avoid triggering a full-scale NATO-Russia confrontation

• Give Ukraine the protection it needs

• Retain strategic flexibility

This is a surgical solution to a geopolitical Gordian knot.

5. Strategic Benefits for the United States

While our troops remain off Ukrainian soil during active Russian exercises, we can still extract major strategic value:

• Economic Access: Ukraine holds enormous reserves of lithium, natural gas, grain, and rare earth minerals. Partnership grants the U.S. access to these resources while denying them to Russia.

• Regional Stability: A stable Ukraine helps contain Russian influence in Eastern Europe and reduces Moscow’s global bargaining power.

• Asymmetric Advantage: Without formally expanding NATO, the U.S. creates a “security belt” around Russia—subtle but powerful.

This is rope-a-dope foreign policy. Let Russia punch itself out on the diplomatic front while we gain terrain economically and strategically.

6. Avoiding the Mistakes of 2014

The greatest danger now is inaction—or worse, issuing unenforceable promises. We must learn from the Budapest Memorandum’s failure. Security guarantees must be:

• Enforceable: With clearly defined consequences for violations

• Public: So that both allies and adversaries know the stakes

• Tied to Aid: Military and economic assistance should escalate in response to Russian aggression

The guarantees should also be structured through a coalition—not NATO per se, but a League of Democratic Partners, involving the U.S., U.K., Poland, Baltic states, and others.

7. The Role of Europe and Trump’s Leverage

European leaders, including those in Warsaw and London, have signaled readiness to participate in such a compact. Trump’s rapport with both Ukraine’s Zelenskyy and Russia’s Putin puts him in a unique position to extract meaningful concessions.

Critics scoff at the idea of Trump securing peace—but his unpredictable style, backed by a credible threat of action, has proven effective before. The Alaska summit could be remembered as a turning point—if followed by policy action.

8. Recommendations

1. Codify Security Guarantees in a multilateral agreement signed by the U.S., U.K., Poland, and willing European allies.

2. Avoid NATO Expansion for now. Instead, build a “Ukraine Compact” for defense and economic support.

3. Leverage Ukraine’s Economy by encouraging private investment in critical sectors—energy, agriculture, and tech.

4. Maintain Troop Restraint unless Russian military aggression resumes at scale. Any deployment should only follow blatant violations of agreed ceasefires.

5. Monitor Compliance with a permanent Western observer mission, tied to enforcement triggers.

Conclusion: This Time, Mean What We Say

In 2014, I warned that failing to back up our words in Ukraine would invite disaster. We failed to heed that warning—and we got a war. Now, we’re being given a second chance.

Security guarantees for Ukraine—crafted carefully and enforced seriously—can end the war, contain Russia, and benefit the United States economically and strategically. But they must not be hollow. They must not be vague. They must not be Budapest 2.0.

This is not about nation-building or open-ended conflict. It’s about re-establishing credibility. It’s about seizing an opportunity to win without war. And it’s about keeping promises.